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Why should anyone care about the seemingly interminable philosophical
debate concerning scientific realism? Shouldn’t we simply let go of it, in
the spirit of Arthur Fine’s “natural ontological attitude” (NOA) (Fine 1986,
chs. 7-8)? To a large extent I follow Fine, especially in relation to the
endless arguments surrounding realist attempts to show that the impossible is
somehow possible, that empirical science can really attain assured knowledge
about what goes beyond experience. It is time to face the fact that we cannot
know whether we have got the objective Truth about the World (even if such
a formulation is meaningful). Realists go astray by persisting in trying to find
a way around this fact, as do anti-realists in engaging with that obsession.
I cannot do better than Fine. Yet I find it difficult to let go of the “realist”
label. I feel that it has been hijacked by the most unrealistic of people. I would
like to rescue the notion of realism from the so-called realists, and re-conceive
it as something useful for scientists and others who are actually engaged in
empirical inquiries. If that fails, we will still have NOA.
I do not take scientific realism as a descriptive thesis. Like Bas van
Fraassen, I take it as a statement about the aims of science (Van Fraassen
1980, 8). More actively, I take it as a policy, or even an ideology. “Active
realism,” as I have termed it, is a commitment to do our utmost to learn as
much as possible about reality (Chang 2012, section 4.2).
One might ask: who would possibly object to such a commitment—and
is a position worth defending if no one would object to it? But there are in
fact a great number of people who go against active realism. Against active
realism, anti-realism can take any of the following forms: seeking the comfort
of affirming what we already believe, instead of subjecting our beliefs to the
most informative tests; preferring the simplicity or elegance of theories for
its own sake (rather than for the possible side-effect of facilitating further
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inquiry); insisting that having a consensus is more valuable than allowing all
perspectives that can lead to new learning; making only fictional or idealized
models to do a particular job at hand, rather than finding a theory that can
also work in other circumstances. All of these things happen with depressing
regularity in science as well as religion, politics, and everyday life. In that
context, Charles Sanders Peirce’s motto takes on fresh urgency: “do not block
the way of inquiry.”
There is, however, a significant gap in the conception of active realism as
stated above. In my previous exposition, I took “reality” as mind-independent
nature, something that can resist our attempts to deal with it in some
particular way that we might prefer (Chang 2012, 220). But “reality” in
this sense is like the Kantian thing-in-itself, about which we can and should
say nothing; it is nonsense to think that we can learn anything expressible
about it. So some other notion must be worked out as to what empirical
knowledge is about. This recognition prompts a new and productive train of
thought.
The objects of empirical knowledge must be placed in the operable realm.
Such objects are not “given,” but identified through an effortful process of
inquiry, through which we learn how to parse things out at the same time
as learning about the parsed-out objects. This is one clear sense in which
ontology is empirical.1 My position here is consonant with Ian Hacking’s
“entity realism,” which takes our ability for successful intervention as the sign
of the reality of the putative objects involved in the intervention (Hacking
1983, esp. ch. 16). And I seek to generalize Hacking’s position further into a
coherence theory of reality: a putative entity should be considered real if it is
employed in a coherent epistemic activity that relies on its existence and its
basic properties (by which we identify it).2
The key notion in the definition of “reality” just given is coherence, by
which I mean a harmonious fitting-together of actions that leads to the
successful achievement of one’s aims, rather than mere logical consistency or
any other inferential relation holding among a set of propositions. Coherence
may be exhibited in something as simple as the correct coordination of bodily
movements and material conditions needed in lighting a match or walking up
the stairs, or something as complex as the successful integration of a range
of material technologies and various abstract theories in the operation of the
global positioning system (GPS). Coherence comes in degrees, with a specific
scope, and it is defeasible. The same is the case for reality, if we base the
notion of reality on the notion of coherence. Such a perspective exposes a deep
problem with the binary thinking in Larry Laudan’s pessimistic induction,
1 This is in line with the thoroughgoing empiricism expressed in Dewey (1938).
2 For an explanation of what I mean by an “epistemic activity,” see Chang (2014).
Spontaneous Generations 9:1(2018) 32
H. Chang Realism for Realistic People
and of course also in the realist arguments that he was trying to counter
(Laudan 1981). Caloric, phlogiston, ether, or what have you, isn’t simply
either-real-or-unreal (or referring/non-referring). Caloric had a high degree
of reality in Lavoisierian chemical practices, and it still is real to anyone
who engages in similar practices. It is pointless and meaningless bravado to
declare “but it doesn’t really exist!” By that count, what does? (Laudan’s
main lesson stands.)
I would like to go beyond Hacking in another way, too. He places great
emphasis on the existence/reality of entities, but that is not enough. We
also need to think about what else we can credibly know and say about the
entities. So we need to have a notion of truth, a usable one in the operable
realm, to underpin our practice of making, assessing, and accepting various
statements.3 I would like to propose a pragmatist coherence theory of truth,
according to which a statement is true if (belief in) it is needed in a coherent
epistemic activity (or system of practice). This notion of truth, like the notion
of reality given above, is a matter of degrees and circumstances.
These remarks are only preliminary sketches pointing to a full-fledged
account, which will be published in a book titled Realism for Realistic
People.4 It will be framed, most of all, within a revitalized pragmatism,
deploying a pragmatist (or, operational) notion of coherence to its full
potential within a conception of knowledge as ability rather than as
information. Rejecting traditional notions of scientific realism does not mean
abandoning the pursuit of truth and reality, but revising the philosophical










3 For a classic discussion in this direction, see Austin [1950] (1979).
4 There is some affinity between my line of thought and what Kosso (1998, ch. 8) has
called “realistic realism”. I cannot recall whether I owe the “realistic” trope to Kosso,
but I would be happy for that to be the case. The same phrase is also used by Mäki
(2009), with a rather different intention.
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